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The international working class in 2018 faces declining economic and social conditions 
around the world. Increasingly no longer capable of living in the old manner, the proletariat is 
searching for political alternatives. Voters in Greece, for example, installed the Coalition of the 
Radical Left (Syriza) in January 2015 while millions of Americans were galvanized by the 2016 
presidential campaign of self-proclaimed democratic-socialist Bernie Sanders with his criticisms 
of the “billionaire class” in the United States.1 Yet, the purpose of these parties and politicians 
has been to subordinate the working class to the national demands of their respective 
bourgeoisies.
2
 It is no different in Japan where opposition to Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and 
remilitarization is widespread.
3
 If the working class there is to have a genuine political voice, it 
must have its own political party, one internationally oriented.  
With this growing discontent in Japan, people are casting an examining eye towards the 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP).
4
 However, this party, steeped in decades of Stalinism, is 
incapable of providing a progressive way forward for the working class and youth in Japan or 
Asia. Stalinism—which is what most people think of when they hear the word socialism—is in 
fact a deviation from and perversion of socialism. Contained within this paper is not simply a 
theoretical exercise that examines the origins of socialism in Japan, but also a warning to 
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workers, youth, students, and left-thinking people. Parties and organizations claiming to be on 
the left have either completely reneged on election promises (Syriza) or abandoned any 
orientation to the working class, instead fixating on issues of identity that appeal to the upper 
middle class layers of society. The end result is the rejection of the so-called left, but still facing 
the same economic crises, people turn to the far-right.  
In 2018, the presidency of Donald Trump in the United States is but one example of this 
political shift. For the first time since World War II, fascists (Alternative for Germany) sit in the 
Bundestag in Germany. The far-right Freedom Party in Austria shares power with the 
conservative People’s Party. If the Japanese Communist Party and other Stalinist and pseudo-left 
parties are allowed to continue masquerading as genuinely socialist organizations, they will 
further facilitate the rise of the far-right and betray the aspirations of workers and youth. The 
question may arise then, why not focus on the JCP today and not worry about the past? The 
changes in the JCP did not take place overnight nor are they the result of individual failings. 
They are the result of the steady shift to the right over nearly a century. For this reason, the JCP 
cannot be reformed and this must be shown through a study of its history. 
Marxism versus Stalinism 
Historians and academics when interpreting communism and the Soviet Union typically 
accept Stalinism as the natural progression of Marxism. They paint the struggle within the 
Bolshevik and Russian Communist Party that emerged in 1917 and intensified in the 1920s and 
1930s between the Soviet bureaucracy led by Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky’s Left Opposition 
as irrelevant or simply ignore it.
5
 This interpretation extends to analyses of Marxism’s impact in 
                                                             
5
 For example, the historian Eric Hobsbawm claimed in relation to the Soviet Union that “History 
must start from what happened. The rest is speculation.” Quoted in, David North, The Russian Revolution 
and the Unfinished Twentieth Century (Oak Park, MI: Mehring Books, 2014), 70. 
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Asia and the development of individual parties such as the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). It is 
in light of this conflict that this paper takes its form.  
Historians have sought to place the blame for the political trajectory of the JCP in 
Moscow and the Communist International (Comintern) without dealing with the differences 
between Trotskyism, or genuine Marxism, on one hand, and Stalinism on the other. Right-wing 
academics like Robert Scalapino approached the JCP as a genuinely revolutionary party, 
accepting Stalinism as Marxism.
6
 In a soon to be released book, reflecting the continued 
relevance of the JCP, Peter Berton refers to the party as the Japanese government’s “moral 
compass,”7 which necessarily means bourgeois morality. In the best of these interpretations, had 
Japan’s Marxists been left to their own devices, they would have been free to follow a path that 
took into account the unique conditions in Japan while being unburdened from the demands of 
Moscow that forced the JCP to apply so-called Russian or European conceptions to their 
revolutionary struggle.
8
 In other words, the JCP should have been left free to pursue a national 
path to socialism. This is an entirely anti-Marxist conception and demonstrates the theoretical 
vacuum currently present, specifically in regards to the political fight between Trotsky and Stalin. 
The national road to socialism was in fact a Stalinist construction. Marx and Engels had insisted 
that socialism could only be achieved on the international level, which both Bolshevik leader 
Vladimir Lenin and Trotsky fought to advance. Marx and Engels wrote in 1850 regarding the 
revolutions two years prior, 
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 It is certainly far easier to attack Stalinism than Marxism. Ironically, in order to make the claim 
that socialism is not feasible, anti-Marxist historians take Stalinist lies as good coin, utilizing them for 
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 This is the essential position put forward in Germaine A. Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of 
Development in Prewar Japan, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
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While the democratic petty bourgeois want to bring the revolution to an end as quickly as 
possible, achieving at most the aims already mentioned, it is our interest and our task to 
make the revolution permanent until all the more or less propertied classes have been 
driven from their ruling positions, until the proletariat has conquered state power and 
until the association of the proletarians has progressed sufficiently far—not only in one 
country but in all the leading countries of the world—that competition between the 
proletarians of these countries ceases and at least the decisive forces of production are 




Therefore, this paper will analyze the foundations of the JCP from the position that the 
party was not wrong to follow the international movement as such but that the Communist 
International was perverted by Stalinism, causing the JCP to shift to the right and ultimately 
become a defender of capitalism.   
The Theoretical Framework 
In order to provide both a theoretical contribution towards an alternative for the Japanese 
and international working class and to explain what Stalinism is requires an examination of the 
history of the JCP based upon scientific Marxism. Marx and Engels developed this field of 
thought on two bases: the first being the discovery of surplus value and the other the dialectical 
materialist understanding of history, the latter of which I will employ here. Dialectical and 
historical materialism put simply means that social consciousness comes from social being and 
not the other way around. One’s individual consciousness is therefore derived from their social, 
or class, being. Engels further explained in 1878 that, 
The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production and, 
next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; 
that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is 
distributed and society divided into classes or estates is dependent upon what is produced, 
how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view the final 
causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men’s brains, 
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In contrast to this, Stalin and his supporters fell back on the concept of “socialism in one 
country” and the “two-stage theory of revolution,” neither of which were original, but had been 
taken from the social-democrats who had made their final, irreversible break with Marxism in 
1914 when World War I broke out. Faced with failed revolutions in Europe and modest 
improvements in the Soviet Union during the 1920s, the Stalinists argued that socialism could be 
constructed within a single nation-state in a complete contradiction of Marxism. The “two-stage 
theory of revolution” had been advocated by the Mensheviks11 and held that colonial, semi-
colonial, and otherwise developing countries first had to pass through the bourgeois, capitalist 
stage of economic development before even considering socialism. This became the Stalinist 
rationale for ordering communist parties around the world to collaborate with their bourgeoisies. 
These capitalist parties would then supposedly carry out progressive agendas, but this did not 
occur and in many cases had tragic results.  
Returning to what Engels wrote on materialism, if the Stalinists based the supposed 
development of socialism on the nation-state system, the historical vehicle for capitalism, then 
the modes of production and distribution must compromise and conform to capitalism. Socialism 
can only be completed internationally, through permanent revolution, as put forward by Marx 
and Engels in 1850. Trotsky expanded upon this concept in the early 20th century, contributing 
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to the victory of the Bolsheviks as a leader of the 1917 October Revolution. With this 
understanding of Marxism in mind, if the JCP does not challenge the capitalist mode of 
production, then it becomes a defender or capitalism, whether it intends to or not. With this brief 
introduction of Marxism and Stalinism, it is time to delve into the foundations of the Japanese 
Communist Party. 
The Origins of Marxism in Japan  
The origins of socialism in Japan can be traced back to the 1890s and the formation of 
academic clubs for the purpose of discussing political reforms as well as early attempts to 
organize workers into labor unions in response to the rapaciousness of the new Japanese 
bourgeoisie. The1868 Meiji Restoration played a key role in the development of Japanese 
industry and capitalism. However, unlike Western European countries that took centuries to 
develop, it took Japan only a few decades. This development favored the centralization of 
resources and capital in the hands of a few wealthy families, which became known as the 
zaibatsu. With government protection and support, which was necessary for Japan to catch up 
economically with the West, banking capital grew out of proportion to industry, leading to the 
development of Japanese imperialism.
12
 By the 1920s, five banks controlled more than a quarter 
of the country’s bank capital.13 Domestically, this required much more of a police state to drive 
this rapid industrialization while internationally Japan was forced to search out new markets and 
access to resources in order to compete with the existing imperialist powers, leading to war with 
China (1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905) and the colonization of Taiwan and Korea by 1910.  
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 E. Herbert Norman, Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems 
of the Meiji Period (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 110-112. 
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Hoston, Marxism and the Crisis of Development, 7. 
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Many of those who played a role in founding the JCP during this early period of Japanese 
socialism were aligned with the Christian socialist or anarcho-syndicalist movements. Christian 
socialists believed that capitalism could be gradually reformed and did not require a revolution. 
This perspective was similar to the JCP’s today, which claims working class victories can be 
won in parliament.
14
 In contrast, one of the great Marxist revolutionaries Rosa Luxemburg wrote 
in 1898 in regards to the state’s ability to reform itself: 
We know that the present State is not “society” representing the “rising working class.” It 
is itself the representative of capitalist society. It is a class state. Therefore its reform 
measures are not an application of “social control,” that is, the control of society working 
freely in its own labor process. They are forms of control applied by the class 
organization of Capital to the production of Capital. The so-called social reforms are 




Anarcho-syndicalists, on the other hand, placed emphasis on working within trade unions 
and working towards a general strike to overthrow capitalism rather than building a 
revolutionary party to lead the working class. Yamakawa Hitoshi and his comrades like Sakai 
Toshihiko and Arahata Kanson, among the founders of the JCP, were involved in this movement 
for years. They had been supporters of the anarchist Kōtoku Shūsui, who was murdered by the 
Japanese state on trumped up charges in 1911.
16
 This movement was heavily influenced by the 
International Workers of the World and leading anarchists like Peter Kropotkin in Russia. The 
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Robert Thomas Tierney, Monster of the Twentieth Century: Kōtoku Shūsui and Japan’s First Anti-
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right to organize workers to fight for better conditions was an important one, but unions were 
bargaining tools within capitalism and could not go beyond these bounds no matter how militant. 
Lenin wrote in his famous 1902 work, What is to be Done? that within unions “there could not 
yet be Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. This consciousness could only be 
brought to them from without.”17 This meant a party was needed to politically educate workers 
on socialism and provide leadership.
18
 
The 1917 Russian Revolution, 1918 Rice Riots in Japan, and the overall decline in 
economic and political conditions, provided the impetus to Japan’s socialists to turn to 
Marxism.
19
 The wartime boom in which Japan found open markets vacated by the warring 
countries were occupied once more as Great Britain’s, France’s, and the United States’ 
economies returned to normal. Furthermore, while some historians have tried to paint this period 
as a boon for democracy under the Taisho emperor, this window dressing served to paper over 
the actual situation.
20
 Only a small, wealthy minority was allowed to vote in parliamentary 
elections. The two leading parties, the Seiyūkai and Kenseikai, had been formed by and 
represented the interests of the ruling elites. Even when voting rights were extended to all men 
over the age of 25 in 1925, the tradeoff came in the form of the Peace Preservation Law that 
specifically targeted socialists and increased state repression.
21
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 Vladimir Lenin, “What is to be done?,” in Essential Works of Lenin: ‘What is to be done?’ and 
Other Writings, ed. Henry M. Christman (New York: Dover Publications, 1987), 74. 
18
 Though written in 1938, perhaps no sentence better sums up this issue facing workers 
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Founding the JCP: The Necessity of a Party 
It was in this context that different figures who would found the JCP like Katayama Sen 
and Yamakawa Hitoshi came to Marxism. Katayama Sen, who until this point had been a 
Christian Socialist, had fled police harassment by moving to the United States in 1914. He 
played a role in organizing a small group known as the Association of Japanese Socialists in 
America as well as the American Communist Party. With the aid of Sebald Justin Rutgers, a 
Dutch acquaintance, Katayama was introduced to key figures in the Marxist movement, 
including Leon Trotsky and Nikolai Bukharin in New York in 1917. However, Katayama was 
not heavily swayed by these Russian revolutionaries. International events on the other hand 
played the key role in influencing Katayama’s move towards communism rather than theoretical 
conviction.
22
 In fact Katayama’s understanding of Marxist theory would always remain low.23  
In May 1919, the anarchists Sakai, Yamakawa, and Arahata declared their acceptance of 
Marxism in an issue of their organ, New Society.
24
 The establishment of the JCP was on the 
horizon and with assistance from the Third or Communist International (Comintern), this would 
become a reality in 1922. The Comintern itself was founded in March 1919 as the world party of 
socialist revolution, uniting member parties under the banner of international communism. 
Katayama’s group in the United States and the Sakai-Yamakawa-Arahata group in Japan 
established direct contact that same year through Kondō Eizō, whom Katayama sent to Japan 
from New York. Katayama also set off for the Soviet Union via Mexico. In 1920, they set up the 
Socialist League, a collection of communists and anarchists, and as a sign of things to come, the 
police came down hard on the group, disrupting meetings, and finally ordering it to dissolve in 
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 George M. Beckmann and Genji Okubo, The Japanese Communist Party 1922-1945 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1969), 14. 
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May 1921 under the Public Peace Police Law.
 25
  However, there was a hesitancy to establish a 
formal communist party, in part due to police harassment but also due to a lack of political 
clarification and understanding of international socialism.  
 The Comintern’s influence on the JCP played a significant role on the party’s 
development. The Comintern’s first four congresses dealt with the international revolution and 
included discussion on how to found new movements in non-European or developing countries. 
Responding during debate at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920, Vladimir Lenin stated,  
The question was posed as follows: Are we to consider as correct the assertion that the 
capitalist stage of economic development is inevitable for backward nations now on the 
road to emancipation and among whom a certain advance toward progress is to be seen 




 He continued:  
 
In addition, the Communist International should advance the proposition, with the 
appropriate theoretical grounding, that the backward countries, aided by the proletariat of 
the advanced countries, can go over to the soviet system and, through certain stages of 




Lenin also emphasized the importance of the political independence of communist parties, 
stating: 
The Communist International should form temporary understandings, even alliances, 
with the bourgeois democracy of the colonies and backward countries, but not merge with 
it, unconditionally preserving the independence of the proletarian movement, even in its 
most embryonic form…We, as communists, must and will support bourgeois 
emancipation in colonial countries only when, in those areas, these movements are really 
revolutionary, when their representatives will not hinder us in educating and organizing 
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 The emphasis on the independence of the proletarian movement is crucial to socialism. 
Completely contradictory to what Lenin had said at the Second Comintern Congress, the 
Stalinists, who had taken over the Comintern following Lenin’s death in January 1924, ordered 
communist parties in Asia to subordinate themselves to their respective national bourgeoisies, 
under the claim that in colonial, semi-colonial, and developing countries, the bourgeoisie could 
be progressive. This had tragic results, notably in China, where the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) merged with the Kuomintang, which suppressed the ability of the CCP to fight for 
Marxism. Stalin infamously claimed in an April 5, 1927 speech, one week before Chiang Kai-
shek’s massacre of Shanghai communists and workers,29 that the Chinese bourgeoisie would be 
“used up and tossed away like a squeezed lemon.”30 For Japan, Andrew Barshay makes the point 
that the dominance of Stalinist thought in the JCP led to the conception of an “advanced Europe 
and backwards Asia.” Therefore, a distorted understanding of the imperial system and the 
development of Japanese capitalism emerged.
31
 This would have had a disorienting effect on 
Japan’s communists.  
However, at the time of these early congresses, the Comintern was still motivated by the 
concept of internationalism, which can be seen in how the JCP took shape. Kondō, Katayama’s 
envoy from New York, played a role in facilitating contact between the Japanese communists 
and the Comintern. He briefly worked with Ōsugi Sakae, an anarchist who had been invited to 
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 Wang Jingwei, the leader of the so-called Left KMT, also abandoned his communist allies by 
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Shanghai in October 1920 for discussions by Comintern representative, Yi Ch’un-suk.32 Sakai 
and Yamakawa were also invited, but turned down the chance. Ōsugi accepted money from the 
Comintern for publishing his material in exchange for a promise to collaborate with the Japanese 
communists.
33
 His relationship with Kondō, however, was short-lived. They published a 
magazine called, Labor Movement, but Kondō was quickly ready to break with Ōsugi, who 
intensified his attack on the Soviet Union after their split.
34
 At this point, with the Socialist 
League unable to operate due to police repression and dissent growing between its members, the 
Comintern sent Yi Chung-rim to Japan in April 1921 to try and once more establish contact with 
the Japanese communists. He turned to Yamakawa, on the advice of Kondō, as George 
Beckmann and Okubo Genji suggest, who responded favorably.
35
 Yamakawa and Kondō began 
to work on preparations for a formal communist party and a branch of the Comintern. With Sakai, 
Arahata, as well as a few others, they formed a small group and then sent Kondō to Shanghai for 
further discussions and formally broke with Ōsugi and the anarchists. However, uncertainty 
continued to plague the group, especially after the failure of the Socialist League.
36
 
It would be wrong to simply blame these figures for their reluctance and uncertainty and 
contribute that solely to the early problems of the JCP. In a country with as repressive a regime 
as Japan, it was certainly difficult for socialists to get a hold of Marxist material, let alone 
circulate it and discuss it. The police had also learned of intentions to create a formal communist 
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 Kondō, having received money from the Comintern to set up a party, had drawn the 
suspicion of police when he returned from Shanghai, missed a train to Tokyo at Shimonoseki, 
and chose to use some of his funds to get drunk and find a prostitute. Police detained him, 
discovered the money, managed to extract some information from him about his political 
purposes, but ultimately let him go. Faced with the wavering positions of Sakai, Yamakawa, and 
Arahata, Kondō attempted to establish a party in August 1921 amongst students at Waseda 
University, known as the Enlightened People’s Communist Party (Gyōmin Kyōsantō).38 However, 
their activities, which included leafletting at the homes of military personnel taking part in drills 
around Tokyo that fall, led to the mass arrest of party members, including Kondō.39 He 
ultimately faded from influence in the socialist movement at this point.
40
 
There were other Japanese figures working overseas in the communist movement, 
including delegates who attended the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, held in 
January-February 1922 in Moscow. One of these was Nosaka Sanzō, who joined the British 
Communist Party in 1920 and later rose to prominence in the 1930s and in postwar Japan as a 
party leader. However, he did not have voting rights at that point.
41
 Other attendees hailed from 
China, Korea, Mongolia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and the United States.
42
 Katayama was 
selected as an honorary chairman, alongside Lenin, Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev, and Stalin. 
Reflecting the influence of Japanese imperialism and emphasis on internationalism, Zinoviev, 
the chairman of the Comintern, told the congress, “The only thing that really can solve the Far 
                                                             
37
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Eastern question is the defeat of the Japanese bourgeois and the final victory of the revolution in 
Japan…The greater then is the responsibility of the young Japanese proletariat.”43 
The congress provided a strong impetus for the JCP’s establishment on July 15, 1922. 
Delegates returning to Japan from Moscow contacted Sakai, Yamakawa, and Arahata and 
encouraged them to found the party, which they did, though still reluctantly.
44
 They began 
operations on February 23, 1923. Almost immediately after, on June 5, the entire leadership was 
arrested on charges relating to anti-state activities and the party, in effect, ceased to operate.
45
 
Following their release the next year, many of the party members questioned whether or not to 
rebuild the party. A majority at first, following Yamakawa, argued that conditions in Japan were 
not right for a communist party.
46
 Yamakawa, joined by Sakai and Arahata, pushed for 
conducting work solely within the labor unions instead, similar to their former anarcho-
syndicalist position. In 1925, they formed the Labor Union Council of Japan (Nihon Rōdō 
Hyōgikai or simply Hyōgikai for short) with 15,000 workers, but it was dissolved by the 
government in 1928.
47
 Over those three years, membership had grown to 23,000.
48
 Communists 
along with non-communists also attempted to form a legal party, the Labor-Farmer Party (Rōdō 
Nōmintō)49 during this period. This was the beginning of the “united front with all progressive 
elements, (emphasis in original)” which as Scalapino points out, was “a value-laden qualification 
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that could be interpreted differently, depending on the occasion.”50 In other words, it was 
dependent upon whom the Stalinist bureaucracy in Moscow chose to align with at any given 
moment. 
The Yamakawa faction, arguing for working solely within labor unions like Hyōgikai or 
legal parties rather than emphasizing the importance of a communist party, was opposed by a 
second group led by Fukumoto Kazuo. He rejected cooperation with non-communist parties and 
organizations, and was subsequently accused of “Trotskyism,” for ignoring the united front and 
trying to set up a party built solely on intellectuals.
51
 By 1926, his influence was rising in the 
party, particularly among youth.
52
 He ridiculed the charges of being a “Trotskyite” as “complete 
nonsense” in a 1957 interview,53 and in fact his theories were more of an adaptation to Stalinism. 
He viewed Japan’s 1889 constitution as the significant moment when Japan entered a distorted 
bourgeois stage, but had not completed it.  
Fukumoto claimed the Meiji Restoration “paved the way for the development of 
capitalism. This revolution overthrew Japanese feudalism, but since it brought about the rule of 
autocracy, it was not a bourgeois revolution.”54 This is fully in line with Stalinism. However, the 
following is not. According to Fukumoto, after 1889, “the bourgeoisie turned reactionary, 
compromised and combined with the autocratic forces, and has today developed in itself the 
germ of fascistic dictatorship.”55 Fukumoto’s reasoning was similar to Yamakawa’s even if they 
reached different conclusions. Fukumoto accepted the Stalinist line as far as the bourgeoisie was 
concerned, but believed that Japan’s own unique conditions meant that the bourgeoisie could not 
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carry out Stalin’s two-stage theory and that the JCP should not apply those lines to their own 
struggle. He claimed that only after the supposed 1889 revolution, the year the Meiji Constitution 
was proclaimed providing limited parliamentary politics, did the capitalist class become 
reactionary and that it could still be progressive in other cases. Fukumoto was attempting to build 
the JCP along nationalist lines by rejecting the Comintern’s directives. In fact, he believed that 
he was sidelined for attempting to win more independence for the JCP from Moscow.
56
 
Fukumoto and Yamakawa both rejected the international aspect of the revolution, just as much 
as Stalin did. 
The 1927 Thesis and the United Front 
The struggle between the Yamakawa and Fukumoto factions brought about the 1927 
Thesis and both leaders were sidelined as a result. However, this did not mean the end of 
factional disputes, as a new one emerged. Yamakawa, refused to abandon his line, which led to 
the formation of the Rōnō-ha, or Rōnō Faction (workers and farmers), in opposition to the Kōza-
ha (feudalist), or the mainstream faction, which rejected both Yamakawa and Fukumoto. The 
Kōza-ha followed the Stalinist two-stage theory of revolution. The Rōnō-ha, which left the JCP, 
argued that Japan was indeed a capitalist country, but that the revolution could be carried out 
through merging with labor unions.
57
 They did not discount the two-stage theory, but merely 
claimed it was incorrect for Japan.  
Both factions followed some form of the “united front.” A united front in and of itself 
was not proscribed by genuine socialists, but it certainly carried with it strict conditions. 
Freedom to criticize other groups in the front, continuing to put forward a Marxist position, 
remaining independent and not merging into other parties were all basic points. The goal of such 
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a front is not to simply achieve short-term goals, but to demonstrate to the working class and its 
allies amongst farmers/peasants, youth, and progressive layers of intellectuals and the petty 
bourgeoisie that it is the Marxist party alone that stands at the head of the revolutionary 
movement.  
However, with the 1927 Thesis, which was written by the Comintern, it is clear that the 
lessons of the previous ten years were not taken into consideration by the Stalinists. This 
document, formally known as “A Resolution to the Problem of Japan,” delivered a rebuke to the 
Yamakawa and Fukumoto factions who were drifting from the control of the Stalinist Comintern. 
It was marked by centrism, or the balancing between socialist and bourgeois strategy. One 
section stated, “The struggle against opportunist and reformist leaders should be conducted in 
such a way as not to estrange the leftist elements of the trade unions and mass parties; rather, the 
communists should fight within these organizations by exposing the leaders and winning over 
the masses from them. Otherwise the communists risk becoming isolated from the mass labor 
movement.”58 It further called on the JCP to join with the centrist Japan Labor-Farmer Party. 
This was similar to the Comintern’s position in China, where the KMT was also considered a 
worker-peasant party. The Stalinists claimed that since “nine-tenths” of the KMT was comprised 
of either workers or peasants, they could pressure the party leadership to carry out a socialist 
agenda.
59
 The same idea held true in Japan. Chiang Kai-shek’s and Wang Jingwei’s 
abandonment of the CCP should have been enough to prove the Stalinist conception of a worker-
peasant party wrong. Instead, Moscow refused to allow any discussion on the events in China. 
The thesis was accordingly approved by the Comintern and its Japanese representatives in July 
1927. 
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 It must be pointed out that neither Japan nor China was the first place where the 
conception of a “worker-peasant party” was demonstrated to be insufficient for socialist 
revolution. The Bolsheviks had put forward a similar conception of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and the peasantry prior to 1917.
60
 This meant a union between the property-less 
working class and the petty bourgeois, landing holding peasantry. The working class would have 
to be restrained in its demands to accommodate the peasantry. Lenin believed that this union 
would be able to ameliorate conditions for workers and peasants while the revolution would 
spark new ones in Western Europe, which could then come to the aid of the Bolsheviks.  
When Lenin returned to Russia from Switzerland in April 1917, he recognized that the 
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry was unviable as the peasantry supported the 
Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. Both parties were backing the capitalist Provisional 
Government that had replaced Tsar Nicholas II’s regime. Lenin was then won over to Trotsky’s 
position of permanent revolution.
61
 This meant the following: There no longer existed a 
progressive national bourgeoisie capable of carrying out democratic reforms like those in 1776 
America or 1789 France, prior to the emergence of the working class. Therefore, the proletariat, 
independently of other classes, would carry through the revolution and begin to implement a 
socialist program. On this basis, the most politically advanced peasants were also won over. 
Finally, the revolution would not stop at the national borders, but would continue until completed 
globally, hence the world permanent.
62
  
For the Japanese communists, in order to remain inside such a centrist party, the JCP 
would have to accommodate itself to that party or any other organization it worked within or 
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attempted to work within, hence the reason the Comintern initially proscribed such unions at its 
Second Congress in 1920. It would not be able to criticize the centrist party for fear of 
“estranging the leftist elements” and the JCP would give up its political independence. This is 
precisely what occurred in China. Following the KMT’s bloody purges in 1927 that left 
thousands dead, Stalin intensified his campaign against Trotsky in order to solidify his hold on 
the Soviet bureaucracy and prevent a thorough discussion and understanding of the issues facing 
the Comintern.
63
 For the JCP, remaining with the Comintern necessitated yielding to Stalin’s 
demands, but with no opportunity to discuss the failed policies or sharp shifts in tactics that went 
unexplained to Comintern members.
64
  
Trotsky warned in December 1927 that Stalinist centrism had begun a “period of decline 
and not of upsurge. That means short zigzags to the left, longer zigzags to the right.”65 This 
meant wild vacillations in policies over the next decade, which again went unexamined. By 1928, 
the Comintern entered what is known as the Third Period, during which the Stalinists criticized 
left-leaning, national parties as “social fascists.” Through these means, Moscow and the 
Comintern covered up its failures, banned discussion, and continued along its rightward 
trajectory. Trotsky also issued a warning in January 1928 that “without studying the mistakes 
that were committed—the classic mistakes of opportunism—it is impossible to imagine the 
future revolutionary preparation of the proletarian parties of Europe and Asia.”66 
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The Great Depression and More Mass Arrests 
Economic growth slowed in many areas of Japan by the end of the 1920s. The 1927 
banking crisis and then the Great Depression two years later hit the country particularly hard. 
Between 1917 and 1931, economic growth averaged only 2.75 percent.
67
 This revitalized Japan’s 
leftwing movement
68
 and by 1928, the JCP appeared to be on the rise following Diet elections 
held on February 20. This was the first election since the new 1925 suffrage law increased the 
electorate from three million to thirteen million
69
 and two members of the JCP-affiliated Labor-
Farmer Party were elected. The JCP itself was also growing numerically, from only seven 
members in the spring of 1925 to forty by February 1926.
70
 Despite the repression that was soon 
to follow, the party continued to grow, reaching two hundred members in 1929 and then over 
four hundred in 1932.
71
 
While this growth was taking place, the JCP was still an illegal party as it called for the 
elimination of the monarchy. The law at the time banned any party calling for the overthrow of 
Japan’s kokutai.72 Fearing the rise of anti-government sentiment in the face of declining 
economic conditions, the first of a series of mass arrests were conducted on March 15, 1928 of 
communist party members and supporters. The police disbanded the JCP aligned Labor-Farmer 
Party as well as the Hyōgikai labor union. The threat of lifelong jail terms or even execution 
hung over the heads of arrested communists. In order to dull the impact of communism, the 
Japanese government enacted a policy of tenkō, or literally, changing directions. Party members 
who renounced communism, revealed knowledge of the inner workings of the JCP, and pledged 
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support for the Japanese government could see their sentences reduced and be reintegrated into 
mainstream society, authorities hoped, as loyal subjects of the emperor. Young and 
inexperienced members who had flirted with radicalism were heavily influenced by this policy. 
However, the most shocking results of tenkō came in 1933 when Sano Manabu and Nabeyama 
Sadachika, two leading party members arrested in 1929 and who had organized their trials as an 
overall defense of the JCP, denounced the party and devoted themselves to the war effort in 
China. Both served the Japanese government in Beijing during the 1940s.
73
 The overall effect 
was a flood of communists, demoralized by the defections of their leaders, to similarly renounce 
their commitment to revolution.
74
 
The JCP fell into the same cycle as it had after the first mass arrests in 1923. Disputes 
over whether or not to work within legal unions and parties emerged again, requiring the 
Comintern to once more step in, which wrote,  
Special stress should be laid on the strengthening and improvement of the illegal 
apparatus so as to counteract the measures of the government, which are calculated to 
destroy the Communist Party, as well as all revolutionary organizations, through police 




This was easier said than done. Party members returning home from the Soviet Union to assume 
leadership roles were often quickly arrested. By 1935, much of the JCP leadership in Japan was 
behind bars and would not see freedom until released by the American Occupation government 
in October 1945. Organized party activity had largely ceased within Japan.
76
 
This, of course, did not mean party activity came to a halt abroad or that the Soviet Union 
gave up on trying to forge a party to its liking. Members like Katayama were still in Russia and 
others like Nosaka managed to join him by 1931. Katayama was in a position of great influence, 
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yet he seemed content by this point to sit back and allow the younger generation to take over.
77
 
In the conflict between the Stalinist bureaucracy and Trotsky’s Left Opposition, Katayama, while 
supposedly initially sympathetic to the latter, went over to the side of Stalin. He found Trotsky 
egotistical and unyielding while Stalin was more affable and willing to sit down and listen to 
others,
78
 certainly not a quality most today would attribute to the dictator.
79
 
The 1931 Draft Thesis and the 1932 Thesis  
By this time, other conflicts were emerging in the JCP. A new draft thesis in 1931 was 
rejected by Moscow under charges of “Trotskyism.”80 It would be correct to say the draft thesis 
drifted too far to the Rōnō-ha position. Regardless, a new document, the 1932 Thesis was put 
forward instead, calling for united fronts with non-communist parties and organizations and the 
continued position that the Japanese monarchy was the principle target of the JCP, not the 
Japanese bourgeoisie. This was a strengthening of the 1927 Thesis and would be the leading 
document for the JCP until the late 1940s, playing a role in forging the JCP postwar policy of 
accommodation to the American Occupation. Comintern documents that would go into forming 
the 1932 Thesis show the position of the Stalinists. A February 6, 1930 resolution of the West 
European Bureau of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) told the 
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JCP, “The communist party, whose united front tactics are to be operated only from below, must 
not only refrain from any agreement with the reformists and pseudo-communists, but must carry 
on an irreconcilable struggle against them.”81 However, the social-democrats, like the Social 
Masses Party (SMP), and their supporters were derided as “social fascists.”82 This term obscured 
the class differences between the reformists and militarists in Japan, not to mention which groups 
were acceptable to merge with and which were not, leading to disorientation. The SMP, however, 
was quickly moving to the right to support Japanese imperialism, backing Tokyo’s claims by the 
end of the 1930s that Japan was liberating Asia from Western influence, but it was incorrect to 
call them fascists.
83
 Rather than trying to expose the social-democrats and their anti-working 
class agenda, the JCP merely denounced them while failing to win workers to its banner. This 
could have been done by explaining the differences between social-democracy and fascism and 
demanding the former take up a fight against the latter. The social-democrats would have been 
unable to do this and thus expose themselves as a non-proletarian organization. 
In a May 20, 1932 document from the West European Bureau of the ECCI, the 
Comintern sought to portray the Japanese government as one mired in feudalism. It stated,  
The Communist Party of Japan, whose main goal is to establish socialism, must clearly 
and fully realize that in present Japanese conditions the road to the proletarian 
dictatorship must lead through the bourgeois-democratic revolution (emphasis added), 
that is, through the overthrow of the monarchy, the expropriation of the landlords, and the 
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This paragraph was repeated in the 1932 Thesis. For the Stalinists, therefore, the class 
interests of the workers could be surrendered if it meant the overthrow of the monarchy, a 
capitulation to Japanese imperialism, which was colonizing Asia and going to war with its 
neighbors no less than any other imperialist power. With the monarchy and bourgeoisie closely 
bound together, only the working class could have swept away the emperor system, which would 
have also required sweeping away the bourgeoisie.  
The Popular Front 
With the coming to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany, the Comintern, disoriented, 
implemented a new tactic, clearly at odds with previous pronouncements, and which brought to 
an end the Third Period. Communist parties around the world were to form “popular fronts” with 
capitalist parties in the name of fighting fascism. It was no different in Japan. A February 1936 
Letter from Nosaka and Yamamoto Kenzo in Moscow to the JCP stated, “The communists and 
their supporters must join the legal mass organizations of the working people—above all, labor 
unions and peasant unions. Along with these organizations they must join the Social Masses 
Party.”85 There was of course no attempt to explain or clarify why yesterday’s “social-fascists” 
were now allies. The SMP, as mentioned, actually ended up backing the rise of Japanese 
militarism, as did most political institutions at the time, regardless of whether or not they 
considered themselves left or right-wing. The SMP’s support for the government no doubt 
further disoriented the JCP.  
The failure to stop fascism’s rise and the constant shift in policies significantly weakened 
the Stalinist bureaucracy, leading to the purges of the Comintern. The JCP was certainly not 
immune from this. The frame-ups of political opponents culminated in the Moscow Trials and 
the execution of former leading Bolsheviks like Zinoviev and Kamenev. The purges were 
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designed to remove the remaining vestiges of the adherents to Marxism-Leninism who had taken 
part in the 1917 revolution. As Leon Sedov, the son of Trotsky and a leading revolutionary in his 
own right, explained, the purges were a way of cutting off the Soviet Union from its 
revolutionary past: “Stalin not only bloodily breaks with Bolshevism, with all its traditions and 
its past, he is trying to drag Bolshevism and the October revolution through the mud. And he is 
doing it in the interests of world and domestic reaction (emphasis in original).”86 The number of 
Japanese victims in this purge are still not clear, but with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991, documents became available that suggest there were approximately 80 victims of the 
Stalinist terror, according to Tetsuro Kato.
87
 Nosaka played a leading role in the JCP purges after 
his influence in the Soviet Union increased following the death of Katayama in 1933. Nosaka, 
while working in the United States, denounced other leading members of the JCP in the Soviet 
Union, including Yamamoto Kenzo, which led to his arrest in 1937 and execution in 1939.
88
 
Nosaka went on to be one of the leading figures of the JCP for most of the 20th century. 
He became the chairman of the party after the war and held the title of honorary chairman until 
1992 when the documents revealing his hand in purging comrades leading to their executions in 
the 1930s came to light and he himself was purged from the party at the age of 100. He also 
spent time during World War II in Yan’an, the base of the Maoist Chinese Communist Party. 
While there, he established contact with American observers in 1944, hoping to win their 
approval for allowing the JCP to play a role in the so-called democratization of Japan following 
the end of the war.
89
 With the release of party leaders after Japan’s defeat, Nosaka90 led the party 
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in doing precisely that, preparing a new period of betrayals and turn towards becoming an 
established bourgeois party in the second half of the 20th century. 
Conclusion  
The exposure of the Japanese Communist Party is an important task in educating the 
Japanese and international working class. However, it would be wrong to say the JCP’s 
degeneration was the result of personal failings. Without the ability to discuss the theoretical 
issues involved, the JCP’s attempts to accommodate itself to Japanese capitalism, which became 
even starker in the postwar period, were responses to the failures suffered by the party and the 
Comintern. Yet, much of the existing research from historians like Scalapino and Swearingen is 
from a right-wing perspective, with their investigations conducted in accordance with think-tanks 
for governmental policy considerations during the Cold War. Their works paint the JCP as a 
genuinely Marxist party by conflating socialism with Stalinism, providing support for Stalinist 
falsifications of history and claims that he represented the continuation of the October 
Revolution. Stalin’s betrayals of Marxism led to the degeneration of the first workers’ state in 
history, the Soviet Union. In order to maintain hold on power, the bureaucracy that he led forced 
parties like the JCP to follow the same reactionary path as that in Russia and preventing the 
emergence of a genuine working class party in Japan. Today, the JCP holds twelve seats in the 
lower house and fourteen seats in the upper house of Japan’s National Diet. While these numbers 
may seem small or even insignificant, it continues this habit of merging with or seeking alliances 
with some faction of the bourgeoisie and the party now backs the main opposition Constitutional 
Democratic Party of Japan. The Stalinist JCP may have gained support with their apparent 
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denunciations of the Abe government, but just like other phony left and Stalinist parties around 
the world, it will betray the aspirations of the working class and young people fighting against 
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